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A Traditional Decision in Nevada
Rulings in products liability cases where the injured
plaintiff's ability to recover in contract for a breach of
warranty depends upon the forum's attitude toward the
defense of lack of privity have developed a very wide
spectrum of views from the most conservative to the most
liberal extremes. And though the Uniform Sales Act governs
such actions in thirty-five states, many courts' inclination
to circumvent its provisions through their own interpretive
language has weakened its objective of harmonizing the
common laws of sales throughout the United States.
There may be a trend toward relaxing the requirement
of privity of contract'; nevertheless, remarkably conserva-
tive decisions continue to appear. Such was the recent
Nevada case of Long v. Flannigan Warehouse Company and
Inland Ladder Company. A workman injured because of
latent defects in a ladder bought by -his employer for him
to use on the job joined the seller and the manufacturer
for suit in tort and contract, in the one cause of action for
negligence and in the other for breach of implied warranty.
On the ground of lack of privity the court dismissed the
contract actions and also the tort action against the seller,
he being under no duty to inspect for latent defects. 3 Thus
the court tried the tort action as between the plaintiff and
the manufacturer alone and found the plaintiff had failed
to prove his case.4
That the plaintiff lost in tort against both defendants
is little to be wondered. On the one hand, recovery against
I William L. 'Prosser, "The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liabil-
ity to the Consumer)," 69 Yale L. Jour. 1099. Dean Prosser pre-
fers to be noncommittal on this point.
2 382 P. 2d 399 (1963).
3 382 P. 2d 399, 404.
4 The elements of proof were 1) that there was a defect in the
ladder, 2) that the defect existed. when the ladder left the pos-
*session of the manufacturer, 3) that the manufacturer had violat-
ed a duty of ordinary care, and 4) that injury followed as a
proximate result. Case, supra., at page 404.
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the manufacturer required bearing a difficult burden of
proof; and on the other, recovery against the seller depend-
ed on breach of a duty that the court had decided did not
exist.
But recovery in contract would have been much easier,
because the plaintiff need have proved only the existence
of the implied warranty, its breach, and injury as a proxi-
mate result. In Nevada, however, recovery on such a theory
would have to depend on the local meaning of sections 15
(1) and 15(2) of the Uniform Sales Act: 5
(1) Where the buyer, expressly or by implication, makes
known to the seller the particular purpose for which the
goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies
on the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the
grower or manufacturer or not) there is an implied
warranty that the goods shall be reasonably fit for
such purpose. (2) Where the goods are bought by de-
scription from a seller who deals in goods of that de-
scription (whether he be grower or manufacturer or
not) there is an implied warranty that the goods shall
be of merchantable quality.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Nevada proceeded
upon the supposition that a contractual relationship of some
kind must precede a recovery founded upon a contract
theory. The precise question that the court decided to re-
solve was not the kind of relationship between plaintiff
and defendants 6 but lack of privity as an effective defense
to an action for breach of implied warranty. Upholding
lack of privity as a defense, the court reasoned:
Clarity in our law will not be served by applying the
Uniform Sales Act to parties for whom its provisions
5 The sections of the Nevada code corresponding to sections 15 (1)
and 15(2) of the USA are NRS 96.240(1) and 96.240(2).
6 The court referred in passing, to two clauses of section 76 of the
Uniform Sales Act (NRS 96.020), which state: "Buyer means a
person who buys or agrees to buy goods or any legal successor in
interest of such person. . . Seller means a person who sells or
agrees to sell goods, or any legal successor in interest of such
person."I
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were not designed. If liability is to be placed upon either
the retailer or the manufacturer it must rest upon (a)
his negligence or (b) upon a declared public policy that
one who sells a product in a condition dangerous for
use shall be strictly liable to its ultimate user for in-
juries resulting from such use, although the seller has
exercised all reasonable care and the user has entered
into no contractual relationship with him (liability
without fault.7
Two previous decisions referred to in the opinion failed to
show that the law of Nevada on the point was clear to begin
with. These were Underhill v. Anciaux8 and Cosgriff Sign
Co. v. Matthews,9 both of which turned on negligence alone.
This situation left the court a choice between applying the
Uniform Sales Act or interpreting its language. By its
literal application of the Act in an effort to serve clarity
in the law, the Supreme Court of Nevada seems to be as-
serting a powerful conviction that a statute should mean
what it says, even though such a meaning may express only
the legislature's original intention.10 Meanwhile in the
majority of Uniform Sales Act jurisdictions today, the
courts have effectively enough made the Act say what they
have decided it should mean." So that the state of the law
7 382 P.2d 399, 403.
8 68 Nev. 69, 226 P.2d 794, in which green slime appeared in a
bottle of Coca-Cola. The court admitted, at page 796, "Some
authorities rely upon breach of implied warranty, although many
reject this theory of recovery in absence of privity of contract ....
There can be no question as to the general trend toward granting
of such recovery."
9 78 Nev. 281, 371 P.2d 819.
10 Prosser, at page 1128 (note 1, supra.): "Warranties on the sale
of goods are governed in thirty-five states by the Uniform Sales
Act, a codification of the common law rules, which was promulgat-
ed in 1906 at a time when there was no such thing as a warranty
to any third person. The definition of 'buyer' and 'seller' in the
act were drawn with the immediate parties to the sale in mind,
and it specifically provides that there are no implied warranties
of quality except as set forth."
11 The Federal District Court of Hawaii in Chapman v. Brown, 198
F. Supp. 78, 102 (1961), in determining that the law of Hawaii
would not demand privity of contract as a prerequisite to recovery
for breach of an implied warranty under the Uniform Sales Act
said, "By the clear weight of authority today, even in jurisdic-
tions having the Uniform Sales Act, with respect to food and/or
some other categories of goods, such a warranty runs to others
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regarding the need for privity of contract generally to re-
cover in actions of this type is as unsettled in Uniform Sales
Act states as it is elsewhere. 1 2 Annotations of USA sections
15 (1) and 15 (2) reflect the increasing frequency of cases
permitting recovery through disregard or complete circum-
vention of privity.13
The most recent cases to bear upon the employer-
employee relationship of the Nevada case described have
not clearly moved this aspect of products liability law in
either direction.14 In the New Jersey case of Jakubowski v.
Minnesota Mining and Manufacturing Co.15 the court in
than the immediate buyer as narrowly defined in the Act.
"Even the doctrine of privity, which is the main stumbling block
to extending a remedy to consumers generally (as distinguished
from the immediate buyer) against a seller or manufacturer of a
defective or dangerous product, has itself been used to extend the
remedy to others than the buyer as defined by the Uniform Sales
Act, through various expedients adopted by the courts. . .such as
adopting (a) the theory of a third party beneficiary contract,(b) the agency theory, or (c) some other fiction to establish a
relationship between the injured consumer and the seller or manu-
facturer."
12 Walter H. E. Jaeger, "Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin
Sounded?", I Duquesne L. Rev. 1 (1963), at p. 141: "But even
where the courts have been inclined to relax the doctrine of
privity, they have at times considered themselves blocked by a
narrow interpretation or construction of the language of a sales
statute. Thus the contention has been advanced that certain
sections of the Uniform Sales Act preclude offering any relief
for [142] breach of warranty to one not in strict privity of con-
tract. Other courts have enlarged this interpretation to include
those 'in the distributive chain.' And some have held that the
legislative intent should be held to include those who suffer in-jury from use of the product. Analysis of the cases.. .makes one
conclusion inelectible: the desired uniformity has not been achieved
under this statute."
13 1 ULA 220 and 221, 1962 Supp. 104.
14 Murray v. Brown Aircraft Corp., 259 N.C.-, 131 S.E.2d 367(1963), following Wyatt v. N.C. Equipment Company, 253 N.C.
355, 117 S.E.2d. 21 (1960): "Absent privity of contract, there can
be no recovery for breach of warranty except in those cases where
the warranty is addressed to an ultimate consumer or user. Or-
dinarily, the rule that a seller is not liable for a breach of war-
ranty to a stranger to the contract of warranty is applicable to
an employee of a buyer." The next footnote discusses the other
case.
15 80 N.J. Super. 184, 193 A.2d 275 (1963). This case neatly parallels
the Nevada case of Long v. Flanigan Warehouse etc., 382 P.2d
399. Here, an employee injured by a defective grinding wheel sup-
plied by his employer sued in negligence and also in implied
warranty under the New Jersey enactment of the Uniform Sales
Act (RS 46:30-21 NJSA et seq.).
196.41
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reinterpreting the meaning of implied warranties under
the Uniform Sales Act returned to the historical origin of
breach of warranty actions, which was in tort rather than
in contract. And since warranties which the law imposes
on sales contracts are vehicles of social policy, they deserve
the flexibility of operation that implementation of a social
policy demands.
By calling the -implied warranty a "matter of strict tort
liability" the New Jersey court made the law say what they
thought it should mean. Supporters of the Nevada position
might say that the Jakubowski case portended confusion,
and that good jurisprudence required according to laws
the plain meaning of their words. But the New Jersey case
Lack of privity was the defense to both counts. While the vener-
able MacPherson v. Buick Motor Company, 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E.
1050 (1916) authorized a recovery in tort without privity of con-
tract with the manufacturer, the plaintiff could not sustain the
burden of proof of negligence. On the same ground, the trial court
also dismissed the breach of warranty action. On appeal, the
defendant sought to restrict the scope of Heningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69 (1960), at pp. 99-100, to
the purchaser and members of his family only.
Extending the interpretation of RS 46:30-21 NJSA beyond the
scope of the Heningsen case, the court reasoned: "Increasingly,
during recent years courts following the lead of authorities in
tort law, have broken away from the privity requirement and
found some way of holding a manufacturer strictly liable to the
user of his product. There has been a deepening feeling that social
policy requires that the burden of accidental injury due to de-
fective chattels be placed upon the producer, he being best able
to distribute the risk to the general public through price and
insurance.
"Absent a contract between the manufacturers or sellers and the
person who uses or consumes the goods, most courts have con-
sistently refused to find any warranty. This overlooks the fact
that the action for breach of warranty was originally a tort action,
for breach of a duty assumed.
"Since the warranties we discuss do not represent an expressed
or implied intent, but are warranties imposed by law as vehicles of
social policy, present day authorities hold that the courts should
extend them as far as relevant social policy requires.
"What appears to be the sounder approach is that the implied
warranty is a matter of strict tort liability, not dependent upon a
contract between the parties. It arises because the manufacturers
or sellers, in marketing the goods, assume such a responsibility
toward any consumer or user who, in reasonable contemplation,
might be injured."
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suggests that if in New Jersey the price of clarity in the
law is social injustice it is too high a price to pay.10
16 Ironically, the very absence of either the USA or the UCC in
Virginia has let the Commonwealth take the advanced step of
enacting a statute to cancel the defense of no privity in. such
actions, thus only superseding, not confusing, the common law of
sales. The enactment of 1962 reads: "Lack of privity between
plaintiff and defendant shall be no defense in any action brought
against the manufacturer or seller of goods to recover damages
for breach of warranty, express or implied, or for negligence,
although the plaintiff did not purchase the goods from the de-
fendant, if the plaintiff was a person whom the manufacturer or
seller might reasonably have expected to use, consume or be af-
fected by the goods... . 1" #8-654.3, Code 1950. An addition to §
2-318 of the UCC, which will become effective in Virginia in
1966, specifically averts any conflict with this secttion of the Code.
